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This article seeks to address a misconception concerning the scope of copyright protection of
computer programs. It has been suggested that unlike the US courts, the UK and South
African courts have not drawn a proper distinction between functional works — such as
computer programs — and other copyright works, with the result that they are more likely
to protect ideas, rather than their particular expression. While this may have been true at
some stage, it is certainly not the current position in the UK. The decision of the court in
Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company & another, and subsequent decisions,
represented a sea-change in UK copyright law relating to computer programs, resulting in
comparatively thin copyright protection for computer programs, which corresponds to the
legal position in the US. It was the recognition of the functional nature of computer
programs that led to this change in how programs should be assessed in terms of copyright
doctrine. This more limited protection is considered to strike an appropriate balance
between providing the necessary incentives for the production of computer programs, while
allowing for a sufficiently large public domain.
I INTRODUCTION
Copyright protection has been extended to computer programs in South
Africa since as far back as 1981.1 However, there has been no South African
case law which has considered the scope of such protection since 2006.2
Coincidentally, that was also the year in which the last academic article in
South Africa analysing the scope of copyright protection of computer
programs was published.3 In that, otherwise well-written, article De Villiers
states that, unlike the US courts, the UK and South African courts have not
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1 Northern Office Microcomputers (Pty) Ltd & others v Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C)
at 134. This case protected computer programs as literary works. It was not until
1992, following an amendment to the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, that computer
programs were protected as a distinct category of copyright work.
2 Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd & others 2006 (4) SA
458 (SCA).
3 Roux de Villiers ‘Computer programs and copyright: The South African per-
spective’ (2006) 123 SALJ 315. While there have been articles, and sections in text-
books, written on the copyright protection of computer programs since De Villiers’s
article, the remarks therein relating to the scope (or appropriate scope) of copyright
protection of computer programs have, with respect, been perfunctory. As should
become clear during the course of this article, the scope of copyright protection of
computer programs concerns that which is capable of being protected by copyright.
It requires an examination of the elements of a computer program, and not simply a
statement of the exclusive acts which are reserved for the copyright owner (see s 11B
of the CopyrightAct 98 of 1978).
51
2016 (1) SALJ 51
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
drawn a proper distinction between functional works — such as computer
programs — and other copyright works, with the result that they are more
likely to protect ideas, rather than their particular expression.4The appropri-
ate scope of copyright protection is central to the economic rationale of
copyright law; that is, to incentivise (stimulate) the creation of copyright
works, which is, arguably, the justiﬁcation for copyright. If the scope of
protection is too broad, the incentivising goal will be undermined as such
protection will limit access by other authors to the broader themes and
concepts used to create such works, which would offset the social beneﬁt of
protecting such works.
While De Villiers’s statement may have been a fair comment in respect of
the South African cases which have dealt with alleged copyright infringe-
ment of computer programs (principally due to the dearth of case law), it is
submitted that the case of Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company & another5
represented a sea-change in UK copyright law relating to computer pro-
grams, and that his comment in relation to the UK position (and, arguably,
by extension the South African position6) is, and was at the time of its
publication, incorrect.7His article did not contain a reference to theNavitaire
case, which, arguably, continues to be the seminal case concerning the scope
of copyright protection afforded to computer programs. It would, therefore,
be remiss to let De Villiers’s assertion concerning the scope of protection of
computer programs, as functional works, in the UK (and, by extension, also
probably in South Africa), be the last word on the matter.
Accordingly, this article will examine the developments relating to the
scope of copyright protection of computer programs, and explain why such
protection is more limited than in the case of other, more expressive,
copyright works (or, at least, not as extensive as De Villiers suggests).
II COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Given the dearth of South African case law on the subject, there will be
particular emphasis in this article on the legal developments concerning the
scope of copyright protection of computer programs in the US, and, as
4 Ibid at 332.
5 [2004] EWHC1725 (Ch).
6 The reasons for suggesting that the position in South Africa should be the same
as in theUK are the historical connection, and similarities, between the SouthAfrican
and UK copyright laws, which makes UK case law on the scope of copyright protec-
tion of computer programs particularly persuasive and instructive.
7 It is not clear why De Villiers’s article made no reference to the Navitaire case
supra note 5, which appears to have been published by the time of its publication.
Perhaps the article had already been submitted for publication at the time the judg-
ment was published. His statement may have been true at the time of writing (see
IBCOS Computers Ltd & another v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd & others [1994] FSR
275 at 290). The next signiﬁcant judgment recognised a distinction between func-
tional works and other works (Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd
[2000] RPC 95 at 130).
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already mentioned, the UK. The US and the UK are the leading jurisdictions
concerning copyright protection of computer programs, and software
development. Besides the historical links between South African and UK
legislation, the other reason for focusing on the developments in the UK is
that the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (‘UK CDPA’)8 had to be
harmonised with the EU Software Directive.9 The EU Software Directive is
the most recent multi-national instrument, reﬂecting a broad consensus, on
the scope of copyright protection of computer programs. Although the US
courts were the ﬁrst to lead the way in considering the scope of copyright
protection of computer programs, the most recent cases have been those
decided in the UK, which have been signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the EU
Software Directive.10
Although jurisdictions like the US and the UK protect computer pro-
grams as a form of literary work, and not as a sui generis category of copyright
work as in South Africa, this does not affect the persuasive authority of such
case law in providing guidance on the appropriate scope of copyright
protection in South Africa. South Africa’s decision to protect computer
programs as a sui generis category of copyright work makes it unique, as all
the leading jurisdictions with computer software industries have opted for
the protection of computer programs as literary works.11 This decision was
criticised at the time it was taken: Pistorius suggested that computer programs
were not signiﬁcantly different from other utilitarian literary works, and their
functionality was, also, irrelevant.12 It is, however, submitted that computer
programs are, indeed, signiﬁcantly different from other literary works, as will
be illustrated below. Although jurisdictions like the US and the UK protect
computer programs as literary works, computer programs are only nominally
literary works; for all intents and purposes, on closer inspection, computer
programs in those jurisdictions are, in reality, a distinct category of copyright
work.
In fact, the very reason why determining the appropriate scope of
copyright protection of computer programs has proven to be such a thorny
issue may, in large part, be ascribed to the peculiar nature of computer
programs. This special character of computer programs has now been
8 Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct, 1988 (‘UKCDPA’).
9 Directive on the legal protection of computer programs 2009/24/EC. The
original directive was adopted on 14 May 1991 (Directive on the legal protection of
computer programs 91/250/EEC), and was replaced by the current version, adopted
on 23 April 2009, with effect from 25 May 2009. The two versions are substantially
the same, as the later version was simply a consolidation of the earlier version and its
amendments.
10 See, for example, Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 para 93;
Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd & Others [2007] EWCACiv 219 para 27
and SAS Institute Inc vWorld Programming Ltd [2013] EWCACiv 1482 para 76.
11 T Pistorius & C Visser ‘The Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992 and com-
puter programs:Apreliminary overview’(1992) 4 SAMerc LJ 346 at 348.
12 T Pistorius ‘The copyright protection of computer programs: Literary works
shunned by the proposed Bill’1991DeRebus 833 at 833–4.
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recognised in US and UK case law. The early cases did not appropriately
determine the scope of copyright protection of computer programs due to
the ‘uncritical’ application of the copyright principles applicable to tradi-
tional literary works to computer programs.13
Contrary to Pistorius’s suggestion, the courts have now accepted that the
problem of determining the appropriate scope of copyright protection
presented by computer programs is ‘fundamentally different’ from other
literary works due to their functional character. Therefore it has been
claimed, not without some justiﬁcation, that copyright protection of
computer programs was misplaced; computer programs ‘are effectively a
cuckoo in the copyright nest’.14 In other words, computer programs do not
ﬁt comfortably within the copyright framework— let alone being compara-
ble to other literary works. Determining the appropriate scope of copyright
protection of computer programs, from a legal and economic perspective,
requires a different calculus from other literary works — even other
utilitarian literary works.15
Accordingly, it is suggested that no signiﬁcance should be attached to the
fact that South Africa protects computer programs as a sui generis category of
copyright work, while the US and the UK protect them as literary works; it is
not doctrinally problematic to consider US and UK case law because the case
law from those jurisdictions indicates that computer programs are treated, de
facto, as a separate category of copyright work. In fact, South Africa’s
decision to categorise computer programs as a sui generis type of copyright
work is, arguably, doctrinally more acceptable as it reﬂects the de facto
position in the US and the UK.16
For the sake of completeness, and contrary to De Villiers’s opinion,17 it is
further submitted that the protection of computer programs as a sui generis
category of copyright work is in compliance with South Africa’s obligations,
as a member of the World Trade Organisation, and signatory to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (‘GATT’), pursuant to art 10 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(‘TRIPS’), Annexure 1C of GATT. Article 10 of TRIPS requires that
computer programs be protected as literary works as deﬁned in the Berne
13 See, for example, John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders (No 2) [1993] FSR
497 at 558–9 and Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd supra note 7 at
130.
14 S E Gordon ‘The very idea! Why copyright law is an inappropriate way to
protect computer programs’ (1998) 20 EIPR 10. See also P G Spivak ‘Does form
follow function? The idea/expression dichotomy in copyright protection of com-
puter software’ (1988) 35UCLALR 723 at 728.
15 Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc (1995) 49 F 3d 807 at 819–20.
16 This is not to deny the fact that it does create the potential problem of separating
the authorship (or ownership) of the preparatory material from that of the computer
program (see, for example, L Tong ‘Copyright protection for computer programs in
SouthAfrica: Aspects of sui generis categorization’ (2009) 12 Journal of World Intellectual
Property 266 at 272 and 274).
17 DeVilliers op cit note 3 at 326.
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Convention. The deﬁnition of ‘literary and artistic works’ in the Berne
Convention has a very wide meaning, and includes musical works, dramatic
works and cinematograph ﬁlms. Although most jurisdictions protect some of
these works as distinct categories, it is commonly accepted that this still
complies with the requirements of the Berne Convention.18 Therefore, in
principle, protecting computer programs as a distinct category of copyright
work should comply with art 10(1) as the intention is, arguably, simply that
the various works included within the deﬁnition of literary work should be
protected to the same extent, or in the same manner, as traditional literary
works.19 There is also support for such an interpretation based on the
historical development of art 10 of TRIPS.20
III COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Before embarking on the legal analysis of copyright protection of computer
programs, it is necessary to provide a description of what computer programs
are, and how they function. An understanding of the general nature of
computer programs, and the basic concepts of computer science, will assist
with a proper analysis of the legal issues.21
A computer program is simply a set of ordered, unambiguous instructions
to be performed by a computer.22 This is also essentially the deﬁnition of
‘computer program’ contained in the South African23 and US24 copyright
legislation.25 It should be noted that ‘computer program’ is the protected
category of copyright work, not ‘computer software’. Software generally
refers to more than the computer program. In essence, computer programs
process data (input data) and produce output data, which data could, for
18 For example, in theUK the three types of works are protected as distinct catego-
ries, whereas dramatic works are protected as literary works in SouthAfrica.
19 While it is the case that if computer programs had been protected as literary
works in South Africa, computer programs may have enjoyed a longer period of
protection— the life of the author plus ﬁfty years, as opposed to a period of ﬁfty years
from when the computer program is ﬁrst published or is made available to the public
(s 3(2)(b) of the Copyright Act) — this is not economically signiﬁcant. The period
over which computer programs have a commercial value is much shorter than ﬁfty
years.
20 Tong op cit note 16 at 270–1.
21 Spivak op cit note 14 at 724.
22 R White How Computers Work 7 ed (2004) 66. See also D Appleman How
Computer Programming Works 1 ed (2000) 3–5; Pistorius & Visser op cit note 11 at 346;
P I Kravetz ‘Copyright protection of computer programs’ (1998) 80 J Pat & Trademark
Off Society 41 at 44; Spivak op cit note 14 at 727.
23 CopyrightAct, s 1.
24 Section 101 of the CopyrightAct 1976, Title 17USC.
25 Neither theUK legislation (UKCDPA), nor the EU Software Directive (Direc-
tive on the legal protection of computer programs 2009/24/EC) contain a deﬁnition
of computer program.
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example, consist of text or images.26 Often, some of these input data are
stored in ﬁles associated with the computer program that processes such data.
The term ‘computer software’ thus refers to the computer program and the
associated stored data.27 The distinction is important as the data — input or
output—may constitute separate copyright-protected works, but would not
qualify as computer programs.28 For example, part of the input data which a
computer program may process may consist of a series of artistic works,
which may, in turn, be combined with music to produce another copyright
work, such as a cinematograph ﬁlm. The artistic works, music, and
cinematograph ﬁlm are protectable as distinct copyright works.29 For
example, a program’s user interface (also referred to as the ‘UI’ or the ‘look
and feel’ of a computer program) is part of the output data of a computer
program, and, as such, the product (or result) of the program. This distinction
between a computer program’s user interface and the underlying program is
now generally recognised, and accepted. The European Court of Justice has
conﬁrmed that a graphical user interface does not constitute a form of
expression of a computer program within the meaning of article 1(2) of the
EU Software Directive, and, therefore, the copyright in the computer
program does not protect its user interface; the user interface is not
protectable as a computer program.30
Computers only process instructions in binary digits or ‘bits’: 0s and 1s.
Accordingly, all instructions, or the data to be processed, must be reduced to
binary form — strings of 0s and 1s.31 However, due to the practical
difﬁculties of specifying computer instructions in binary form — a sophisti-
26 Appleman op cit note 22 at 21 and White op cit note 22 at 66. (See also
http://www.differencebetween.net/technology/difference-between-software-and-program/, accessed
on 21 November 2010.)
27 Sometimes computer software is restrictively deﬁned to correspond to the deﬁ-
nition of ‘computer program’ in the South African Copyright Act (C Reynolds &
P Tyman Principles of Computer Science 1 ed (2008) 3), while at other times it is even
more extensively deﬁned to include any related documentation and operating manu-
als (D M Davidson ‘Protecting computer software: A comprehensive analysis’ (1983)
23 Jurimetrics J 337 at 340–1).
28 De Villiers op cit note 3 at 316. For completeness, it is necessary to clarify that
screen displays are part of the output data of a computer program, and, as such, the
product (or result) of the program; they are not computer programs. In the past,
similarities in the user interfaces (pursuant to the so-called look-and-feel protection
afforded to computer programs) were wrongly used as a shortcut to support a ﬁnding
of copyright infringement of the underlying computer program, as a protectable
non-literal element. SeeWhelan Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc (1986) 797
F 2d 1222 at 1244.
29 Davidson op cit note 27 at 373.
30 L J Smith ‘Whether copyright protects the graphic user interface of a computer
programme’ (2011) 17 CTLR 70 at 70–1; Bezpenostní softwarová asociace – Svaz soft-
warové ochrany vMinisterstvo kultury 2010Case C-393/09.
31 Technically, computer programs are not converted directly into a ﬁle in binary
form but go through a process of transformations, which ﬁnally gets processed as
electrical impulses, corresponding to the 0s and 1s.
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cated program could easily consist of hundreds of instructions, and, there-
fore, thousands of bits, which would be difﬁcult for humans to work with—
more convenient tools were developed for creating computer programs.
Programming languages were developed to allow programmers to develop
computer programs in ‘high-level languages’: a mixture of rudimentary
English words and algebraic instructions.32 Because of the ease with which
high-level languages can be understood and used by humans, they greatly
facilitate the development of computer programs; they enable programmers
to more easily construct and follow the logic of a computer program, and
allow for speedier and more concise creation of computer instructions.33 For
example, programmers are able to provide useful, more easily understood
descriptive names for the different elements of a computer program, such as
subroutines, modules, functions, procedures or variables.34 Some of the more
well-known high-level programming languages are Basic, Fortran, Cobol,
C++, and Java.
The computer program written in a high-level language is referred to as
the ‘source code’ of the program.35 In order to be executable, the source
code must be converted into ‘object code’ (that is, the required 0s and 1s, also
called ‘binary code,’ ‘machine code,’ ‘machine language,’ or ‘executable
code’).36 This conversion of the source code to object code is performed by
computer programs called compilers or interpreters.37
32 J F Banzaf ‘Copyright protection for computer programs’ (1966) 14 Copyright L
Symp 118 at 157–8; Kravetz op cit note 22 at 45; C Petzold Code: The Hidden
Language of Computer Hardware and Software (2000) 352–3. The use of these program-
ming languages is made possible as a consequence of computer programs which help
to translate them into the necessary binary form. Before the development of high-
level languages, programmers had developed a more basic, low-level language,
assembly language, which allowed programming using simple command words and
hexadecimal code to represent individual computer commands. While assembly lan-
guage is still useful because it produces computer programs which are smaller and
require less processing time, its use is limited. In any event, the legal analysis relating
to computer programs developed in high-level languages should be equally appli-
cable to programs developed in assembly language. SeeAppleman op cit note 22 at 14
andWhite op cit note 22 at 79.
33 Davidson op cit note 27 at 368; Petzold op cit note 32 at 353.
34 Davidson ibid at 378. Subroutines, modules, functions or procedures are sets of
instructions in a computer program which are executable as distinct units. They are
sometimes referred to as sub-programs, and could be considered as independent
computer programs. A complex computer program generally consists of a master
program— the kernel — which coordinates the interaction of various subprograms.
Variables are essentially the data which are to be processed by a computer program.
SeeAppleman op cit note 22 at 19 and 59;White op cit note 22 at 80.
35 Strictly speaking, source code is the computer code produced by the computer
programmer, in whichever form, a high-level language or directly in binary form
(object code). However, as programming is rarely done in object code, references to
the source code of a computer program are generally to computer code in a high-
level language.
36 This is a simpliﬁcation as object code and machine code are not, technically, the
same thing. Object code, although closely resembling machine code (comprising of
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 57
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
Although only the object code of a computer program is required to use it,
the source code of a computer program, which generally also contains
explanatory comments inserted by programmers, is more valuable to anyone
seeking to establish how the program works as it is readily understandable by
a suitably-trained, or skilled, computer programmer. Therefore, the source
codes are usually kept conﬁdential and the programs are distributed only in
object code.38While the compilation of the source code into object code is a
relatively simple process, the object code is not easily reversible (or
‘decompiled’ in computer parlance) into source code.39During the compila-
tion process of converting source code to object code, programmers’
explanatory comments are ignored; thus, any decompilation will not yield
the helpful comments which may have accompanied the source code. The
compilation process also removes the descriptive names of functions,
subroutines, procedures or variables, which are replaced with symbolic
representations. Furthermore, the logical order of the source code may not
be apparent from the object code, which is more concerned with the order of
execution of the program, rather than its design logic.40 Thus, for anyone
interested in more than using a computer program — for example,
modifying the program — for all practical purposes, the source code is
required, since reconstructing it requires painstaking reverse-engineering.41
Henceforth, the more general term ‘computer code’ will be used when
dealing with matters applicable to both the source code and object code of a
computer program, and where, from a legal perspective, no distinction is
required.
bits), is not in a form which is directly executable and still needs further processing to
convert it into machine code. For purposes of the legal analysis, object code and
machine code can be regarded as equivalent, as is commonly the case in the literature
relating to the copyright protection of computer programs.
37 Appleman op cit note 22 at 149. It is not necessary, from a legal perspective, to
elaborate on the technical distinction between the interpretation and compilation of
the source code of a computer program, sufﬁce to say that most commercial programs
are compiled. Also, the interpretation or compilation of source code, technically,
converts source code into an intermediate language, and not directly into object
code. However, this work will simply refer to compiled programs when referring to
the conversion of source code to object code. SeeWhite op cit note 22 at 86.
38 S M McJohn ‘The paradoxes of free software’ (2000) 9 George Mason LR 25 at
27–8; C HNadan ‘Open source licensing: Virus or virtue?’ (2002) 10 Texas Intell Prop
LJ 349 at 351; Spivak op cit note 14 at 728–9.
39 McJohn ibid at 27–8.
40 Davidson op cit note 27 at 378. In fact, the compiled intermediate language is
speciﬁcally designed to facilitate efﬁciency. It can be rearranged and optimised for
efﬁciency, and in this manner, programs with different source codes can result in the
same low-level machine code. As indicated above, the compilation process produces
intermediate language, which is suitable for optimisation, and this is what decompila-
tion of the object code will reconstruct— not the source code.
41 McJohn op cit note 38 at 27.
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(a) Functional works
The distinction between functional and non-functional works has been
recognised by the UK courts as far back as the 19th century. This was done by
either denying that the alleged copyright infringement had occurred (that is,
providing limited (or ‘thin’) copyright protection) or denying the existence
of copyright in a functional work. In Hollinrake v Truswell a printed sleeve
chart containing words and ﬁgures, used to measure accurately the correct
proportions of the inner, and outer, parts of a sleeve, was held to be a
measuring tool or apparatus — ‘a mechanical contrivance’— not protectable
by copyright.42 It was held that copyright protection did ‘not extend to ideas,
or schemes, or systems, or methods; it is conﬁned to their expression; and if
their expression is not copied the copyright is not infringed’.43 The
exceptions listed in the above quotation from the Hollinrake case were
codiﬁed in US copyright law pursuant to s 102(b) of the US CopyrightAct.44
Despite this long-standing appreciation of the difference between func-
tional and non-functional works, the early case law concerning the scope of
copyright protection of computer programs did not always bear this
distinction in mind.
(b) The functional nature of computer programs
Copyright legislation, as a general rule, does not determine the scope of
copyright protection. The courts have been left with the task of deﬁning its
scope. This has allowed the law to be dynamic: it can respond to the
challenges brought about by rapid changes in technology and its impact on
copyright doctrine. The functional nature of computer programs poses
challenges to copyright law. It necessitates a careful assessment of what
exactly the courts are asked to protect: the assessment of whether a substantial
part of a computer program has been copied should identify — and disregard
— any unprotectable elements, and give the appropriate weight to those
elements which ought to be entitled to only limited copyright protection.
The case law from the UK45 and US46 indicates that the courts did not
42 Hollinrake v Truswell [1894] 3 Ch 420 426 and 428.
43 Ibid at 427.
44 Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc supra note 15 at 816–7;Whelan
Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc supra note 28 at 1234. Section 102(b)
provides as follows: ‘In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in suchwork.’
45 See, for example, IBCOSComputers Ltd & another v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd
& others supra note 7 and the criticism thereof by K Tumbraegel & R de Villiers
‘Copyright protection for the non-literal elements of a computer program’ (2004) 10
CTLR 34.
46 See, for example, Whelan Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc supra note
28 and the criticism thereof by Spivak op cit note 14; and L Green ‘Copyright
protection and computer programs: Identifying creative expression in a computer
program’s nonliteral elements’1992 Fordham EntMedia & Intell Prop LJ 3 at 89.
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initially appreciate fully the nature of computer programs, and too readily
sought analogies with traditional literary works.
Issues concerning the scope of copyright protection have invariably arisen
in cases involving the alleged infringement (particularly, the unauthorised
copying) of a computer program. Infringement by way of copying will take
place if there is sufﬁcient objective similarity between the alleged infringing
computer program and the original program, and there is a causal connection
between the original program and the creation of the alleged infringing
program.47 It is important to bear in mind that copyright infringement does
not require that an entire copyright work be copied; it is sufﬁcient if any
substantial part of the work is copied.48
Copyright-infringement cases involving computer programs can be
divided into two broad categories: cases involving literal (or textual) copying,
and those involving non-literal (or non-textual or non-code) copying.
Literal copying involves the verbatim copying of a program’s computer code,
or any substantial part thereof. Included within this category would be those
cases were computer code has been copied and only colourable alterations
have been made thereto to disguise the copying, or where a computer
program has simply been translated into a different programming language.
The Haupt case from 2006 referred to in the introduction was principally
concerned with literal copying.
Non-literal copying is not a term of art, and there have been various
deﬁnitions of what constitute the non-literal components of a computer
program.49 For example, in the Navitaire case, the court adopted a very
narrow deﬁnition of non-literal copying: it comprised those instances of
alleged copyright infringement where there had been no access to the
computer code.50 However, for purposes of this article, non-literal copying
will be deﬁned as any alleged copyright infringement which is not literal
copying. For convenience, this means any alleged copyright infringement
that does not involve the literal copying of a program’s computer code (or
any substantial part thereof), does not involve only colourable alterations to
disguise such verbatim copying, or which is a mere translation of a program
into another programming language.
47 Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd & another v Erasmus 1989 (1) SA276 (A) at 280.
48 South African Copyright Act, s 1(2A). Similarly, the doing of an unauthorised
restricted act in respect of any substantial part of copyright work will also constitute
copyright infringement (s16(3)of the UK CDPA). The US equivalent is ‘improper
appropriation’, which is the requirement that a material portion of the copyright
work must have been copied. Such a determination will disregard the copying of
facts, general ideas, and unoriginal expression. See M LaFrance Copyright Law: In a
Nutshell 2 ed (2011) 284–5.
49 B Bordoloi, P Ilami, P PMykytyn et al ‘Copyrighting computer software: The
‘‘look and feel’’ controversy and beyond’ (1996) 30 Information & Management 211 at
214.
50 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 para 113.
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The reason for drawing a distinction between literal and non-literal
copying is that, as a general rule, the cases concerning literal copying are not
very illuminating about the scope of copyright protection of computer
programs. This was, for example, the situation in the Haupt case. Cases
concerning non-literal copying, and speciﬁcally the determination of
whether any substantial part of a computer program may have been copied,
have required the courts to grapple with the nature of computer programs, in
order to ensure that their protection does not extend beyond incentivising
their creation. For example, an area in which the functional nature of
computer programs has caused problems is when trying to distinguish ideas
from their expression.51 The idea-expression dichotomy is a fundamental
doctrine of copyright law. Copyright does not protect ideas; only particular
expressions of ideas are protected.52
Of the three jurisdictions, the US courts have, traditionally, not shied away
from the idea-expression dichotomy, possibly because US courts have been
more acutely aware of the economic effects of copyright law, and its social
purpose. For example, in the Whelan case — the ﬁrst important US case
concerning the appropriate level of copyright protection for non-literal
elements of a computer program — the purpose, and importance, of the
idea-expression doctrine in copyright law was made clear.53 The idea-
expression dichotomy in copyright law has its basis in the purpose of the
copyright law, which is to strike an efﬁcient balance between incentivising
the creation of copyright works, and the dissemination of information, to
promote learning, culture and development.54
The determination of what will be regarded as protectable expression ‘may
depend on the type of idea being expressed, the medium of expression, and
even the value of the idea to society’.55 The separation of protectable
expressions from unprotectable ideas involves the identiﬁcation of a series of
abstractions: at one extreme the abstraction may be of such a high level that it
merely describes the general nature of the copyright work, and, at the other
extreme, there is simply the speciﬁc expression. A court has to determine the
speciﬁc protectable abstraction between these two extremes.56 The difﬁcul-
ties presented by the application of the idea-expression doctrine to traditional
51 See, for example, Whelan Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc supra note
28 at 1235–6; Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc (1992) 982 F 2d 693 at
702–4; John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders (No 2) supra note 13 at 523; IBCOS
Computers Ltd v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd supra note 7 at 290–1; Navitaire Inc v
easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 para 94.
52 The idea-expression distinction is also recognised in TRIPS (art 9(2)) and in the
EU Software Directive (art 1(2), and recitals 13 and 15).
53 WhelanAssociates Inc v JaslowDental Laboratory Inc supra note 28 at 1235.
54 Ibid.
55 Banzaf op cit note 32 at 148–9.
56 T Pistorius ‘The copyright protection of computer programs in the United
States of America: The second generation questions (part 2)’ (1992) 25 De Jure 166 at
170.
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copyright works, such as literary or artistic works, are compounded when it
has to be applied to computer programs. Computer programs are both
functional and expressive, and ‘ideas are closely intermingled with the
expression thereof’.57 Much of the case law concerning alleged non-literal
infringement of computer programs has centred on the issue of trying to
distinguish unprotectable ideas (or elements) from protectable expression.
Although computer code may be readable by humans, and, to that extent,
resembles literary works, this belies its true purpose; the primary function of
computer code is to be executed by a computer in order to realise the
purpose of the particular computer program. This qualitative, functional
difference distinguishes it from other forms of intellectual property, such as
creative works or patents, which do not have such a direct, and purposive (or
literal, rather than literary) character. For example, a musical work does not,
by itself, create music, and a patent does not create the patented item.58 The
computer code of a computer program is not just symbolic — like an
architect’s drawing is symbolic of the building to be constructed, or a cake
recipe in relation to the cake described — it is also mechanical in the sense
that it operates in a direct manner. A computer program does not simply
provide instructions for, or reveal, how a computer will work; it actually
makes the computer work in the speciﬁed manner.59 Although the source
code still has to be decompiled into object code, this involves a routine
process (requiring no additional, protectable human effort). Given the fact
that source code has to conform to strict syntactical and semantic criteria in
order to be executable, it is, at least from a legal perspective (and, practically
speaking, from a technical perspective), functional in nature. The quality, and
accuracy, of the source code will determine whether the program will
function correctly, or at all.
Computer instructions must conform to the strict syntactical and semantic
criteria of the chosen programming language if they are to be executed. In
this sense, every portion of the computer code of a computer program is
critical to its operation. This, however, does not mean that every part can be
considered a substantial part of a computer program for purposes of copyright
law.60 Similarly, substantiality does not depend on the extent to which a
particular portion of the computer code is used.61 Moreover, although there
may be differences between programming languages, there are still signiﬁ-
cant similarities, and they all rely on the arrangement of Boolean opera-
tions.62Whether the particular portion taken constitutes a substantial portion
57 Tumbraegel &DeVilliers op cit note 45 at 35.
58 Davidson op cit note 27 at 344.
59 Ibid at 345.
60 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd supra note 7 at 130–1.
61 Ibid at 135.
62 Appleman op cit note 22 at 37. Boolean logic involves a determination of the
truth values of a sequence of operations (‘and’ (conjunction), ‘or’ (disjunction), and
‘not’ (negation)) applied to statements which can have one of two values, ‘true’ (1) or
‘false’ (0).
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of the copyrighted program should depend on the skill and labour involved
in its creation.63
IV THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright law has dealt with issues of non-literal copying in other contexts,
such as ﬁctional works. If copyright protection was conﬁned to literal
copying of a ﬁctional work, copyright protection would provide the author
very little protection against a person who skillfully paraphrases his work. It
would, for example, allow a plagiarist to avoid liability by making immaterial
variations to the copied work. Copyright protection, therefore, necessarily
has to protect more than just the literal text (or translation) of a copyright
work.64 Accordingly, courts have held that the non-literal copying of the
plot, or plot devices, of a play or book can constitute copyright infringe-
ment.65 This approach has been recognised by the courts: copying that
paraphrases, or loosely paraphrases, the computer code of a computer
program, rather than taking the verbatim expression, can constitute copy-
right infringement.66 However, given the functional nature of computer
programs, the scope of protection should not be so broad that it protects the
underlying ideas, or inhibits future creative endeavours by others.67
Given the fact that a computer program can for some purposes, such as
part of the development process, be considered in layers of elaboration and
gradual reﬁnement at various levels of abstraction — moving from a general
idea to a speciﬁc application — these levels of abstraction have been used to
determine the scope of copyright protection of computer programs, to
distinguish unprotectable ideas from protected expression, on the basis of the
idea-expression dichotomy in cases of non-literal copying.68 A typical
example of this form of analysis by analogy was the search for the structure
(or sequence, or organisation) of a computer program.69 The purpose of a
utilitarian work, such as a computer program, was considered to be the
work’s idea, and everything that was not necessary for that purpose was
63 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd supra note 7 at 135. See also
AMurray Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (2010) 196. Similarly, our
courts have accepted that a computer program is original and, therefore, eligible for
copyright protection if its creation requires skill, judgment, or labour (Haupt t/a Soft
Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd supra note 2 at 473).
64 Banzaf op cit note 32 at 148–9; M AHamilton ‘Computer science concepts in
copyright cases: The path to a coherent law’ (1997) 10Harvard J on Law & Tech 239 at
244.
65 Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp (1930) 45 F 2d 119; Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp (1936) 81 F 2d 49; Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp v MCA Inc (1983)
715 F 2d 1327.
66 Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc supra note 15 at 814.
67 Gordon op cit note 14 at 12; Pistorius op cit note 56 at 169.
68 Davidson op cit note 27 at 379; Spivak op cit note 14 at 729–31; White op cit
note 22 at 76.
69 WhelanAssociates Inc v JaslowDental Laboratory Inc supra note 28 at 1237.
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 63
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
considered to be part of the protectable expression of that idea.70 Thus,
provided that there were other computer program structures which could
achieve a similar purpose, the particular detailed structure of the programwas
not essential to its function, and constituted protectable expression of that
idea.71
However, this analogy with literary works such as ﬁction or poetry,
although used by the courts in earlier decisions concerning computer
programs, should, if at all, be used with extreme caution in the case of
computer programs. Non-functional copyright works, like ﬁctional literary
works, are purer expressions of an author’s creative mind: other than the fact
that a literary work may make use of general plot lines, themes, literary
techniques, or stock characters, authors are not constrained by functional
considerations. In the case of ﬁction, or poetry, an author has greater room
for individualised expression; the manner in which something is expressed in
a work of ﬁction, or poem, says a great deal more about what is expressed
(and its author), than in the case of a computer program. Hettinger sums up
this situation in the case of ﬁction, or poetry, as follows: ‘In these mediums,
more so than in others, how something is said is very much part of what is said
(and vice versa).’72
In contrast to ﬁctional literary works, computer programs with a similar
function (or addressing a particular problem) will — because of their
functional nature — necessarily exhibit a greater degree of similarity. The
structure of a computer program leaves much less choice for expression than
creative works in human language, because a program must conform to strict
syntactical and semantic criteria. The more restricted one’s choices are, the
less likely it is that what is created will result in an intellectual creation
protectable by copyright.73 Thus, due to the fact that computer programs
will invariably have to conform to technical requirements, constrained by
efﬁciency considerations (such as the need to manage data ﬂow), and employ
standard techniques and common expressions, a greater degree of similarity
may be required before a ﬁnding of substantial similarity can be sustained.74
Accordingly, copyright protection of computer programs may be required to
be more limited.
As a result of the failure to appreciate this difference, inappropriate use of
copyright concepts well-known in the context of literary works such as
‘structure’ and ‘organisation’ were applied to computer programs.75 Use of a
concept like the structure of a computer program necessarily requires a court
to consider the program at a particular level of abstraction. If copyright
70 Ibid at 1236.
71 Ibid at 1242–3.
72 E C Hettinger ‘Justifying intellectual property’ (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public
Affairs 31 at 32.
73 SAS Institute Inc vWorld Programming Ltd supra note 10 paras 31–3.
74 Banzaf op cit note 32 at 154–5; Green op cit note 46 at 89; Murray op cit note
63 at 199; Pistorius op cit note 56 at 169; Spivak op cit note 14 at 755.
75 Hamilton op cit note 64 at 240.
(2016) 133 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL64
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
protection is extended to the structure of expressions at the wrong level of
abstraction (if it is at all appropriate to use such a concept), it could result in
broader protection than would be appropriate.76 By deﬁning a program’s
idea as its purpose, and everything that was not necessary to that purpose as
part of the protectable expression, the court in the Whelan case favoured an
expansive notion of what constitutes protectable expression.77 This already
overly-broad protection afforded to computer programs was expanded,
culminating in Lotus Development Corp v Paperback Software Intl,78 which
provided protection to a computer program’s user interface, or ‘look and
feel,’ as one of the protected elements of a computer program.79
Despite the US courts initially granting overly-broad protection to
computer programs, subsequent case law involving non-literal copyright
infringement of computer programs signiﬁcantly narrowed the protection
afforded to computer programs, as exempliﬁed by the decision in a different
Lotus Development Corp case.80 This change was attributable to the courts’
greater appreciation of the functional nature of computer programs, and
ceasing to draw inappropriate analogies between a computer program and
non-functional works such as novels, and the law applicable to protecting the
latter type of work. In order to deal with the difﬁculty in determining
whether a substantial part of a computer program had been copied,
alternative tests were developed to determine whether infringement had
taken place.
The most well-known of these alternative tests to determine if two
computer programs are substantially similar is the three-step procedure,
formulated by the court in the Computer Associates case,81 known as the AFC
test: an abbreviation of the three sequential steps — abstraction, ﬁltration,
and comparison.82 It requires a court ﬁrst to break down the copyrighted
program into its constituent structural parts. Each of these parts must then be
analysed to ﬁlter out the unprotectable elements (associated ideas, those ideas
dictated by efﬁciency or external factors, and public domain elements) to
determine the protectable kernel (the ‘golden nugget’) of the program.83
76 Ibid at 273.
77 R Arnold ‘Infringement of copyright in computer software by non-textual
copying: First decision at trial by an English court’ (1993) 15 EIPR 250 at 252; Green
op cit note 46 at 5; Spivak op cit note 14 at 748.
78 Lotus Development Corp v Paperback Software Intl (1990) 740 F Supp 37. The
protectability of the user interface of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program was also
the subject of the case which reversed this trend, Lotus Development Corp v Borland
International Inc supra note 15.
79 T Hill ‘Fragmenting the copyleft movement: The public will not prevail’ 1999
Utah LR 797 at 805.
80 Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc supra note 15.
81 Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc supra note 51 at 693.
82 Ibid at 706.
83 Ibid.
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This protected expression must then be compared to the structure of the
allegedly infringing work to determine if they are substantially similar.84
There has also been a corresponding narrowing of the scope of protection
of the user interface of computer programs. Although the user interface is not
a computer program, as already mentioned above, to the extent that an
element of the user interface is of a functional nature, it too has limited
protection. For example, in Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc
a menu command hierarchy was held to amount to a method of operation—
that is, the means by which an end user operates the computer program —
and which was thus unprotectable.85 Protecting a method of operation
would allow the copyright holder of a program to beneﬁt from the
investment made by users in learning how to use it, rather than its own
investment. The users’ investment could lead to the copyright holder having
a monopoly, not because it produced a better program or because it
represented better value.86 In the Lotus case the court stated that the
functional nature of computer programs does not prevent them from being
copyrightable, but it does change how they should be assessed in terms of
copyright doctrine.87
There has, broadly speaking, been a similar development concerning the
scope of copyright protection of computer programs in the UK. Despite the
UK courts in the ﬁrst signiﬁcant English case concerning non-literal
infringement, John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders (No 2), stating that the
approach set out in Computer Associates was generally consistent with English
law,88 the English courts subsequently rejected that approach, leading to a
widening of the scope of protection.89 This unfortunate tendency was,
thankfully, reversed, with a greater appreciation for the functional nature of
computer programs in the UK.90TheNavitaire decision ﬁnally signalled a full
appreciation for the functional nature of computer programs, and resulted in
the recognition of the thin protection afforded to computer programs,
resulting in a position similar to that which exists in the US.
V THE NAVITAIRE DECISION
The case concerned, amongst other things, the alleged infringement of the
claimant’s (Navitaire) software for a ‘ticketless’ airline booking system called
OpenRes.91 It was claimed that a similar system developed for easyJet Airline
Company (‘easyJet’), called eRes, infringed the copyright in the OpenRes
84 Ibid.
85 Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc supra note 15 at 815.
86 Ibid at 821.
87 Ibid at 819.
88 John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders (No 2) supra note 13 at 526–7.
89 See IBCOSComputers Ltd v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd supra note 7.
90 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd supra note 7.
91 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 para 1.
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system.92 Navitaire did not allege that easyJet, or BulletProof (the company
that developed eRes for easyJet), had access to the source code of its
OpenRes system.93 It was alleged that the overall similarity in the user
functionality of the OpenRes and eRes systems amounted to non-textual
copying of the OpenRes system;94 that the ‘business logic’ of the OpenRes
system had been appropriated.95
The court held that despite the similarities in the appearance of the two
systems to users, the underlying processes by which the two systems operated
were different.96 Because a computer (along with its computer program) is a
deterministic machine, it was possible to identify the speciﬁc responses to
various inputs, and to replicate such behaviour by writing another appropri-
ate program.97 In essence, Navitaire contended that the writing of such a
second program infringed the copyright in the source code of the ﬁrst
program.98 However, it was clear that easyJet and BulletProof had no access
to the source code of the OpenRes system, and that there were differences in
the programming languages, computer code and architecture between the
OpenRes and eRes systems.99 The court also did not consider the eRes
computer code to be a translation or adaptation of the OpenRes code.100
If Navitaire was going to succeed in its claim, it needed to show that, at
some level of abstraction, the defendants copied something (other than the
command set and the screen displays) that was not inherent in the nature of
the business function to be performed by the software.101 The analogy with a
plot of a novel was a poor one because in this case the alleged copyist did not
have access to the copyright work; that is, the computer code.102 In any
event, the notion that the overall functioning of a computer was analogous
to, and protectable in a manner similar to, the plot of a novel, was incorrect.
Unlike the plot of a novel, the user interface was not part of the work itself as
the same result could be achieved by different computer programs, involving
no copying. 103 Computer programs do not have themes, events, plots or
narrative ﬂows; they are process driven in order to achieve a particular
outcome. There was no discernible business logic which could be identiﬁed
from the computer code of a computer program.104
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid para 2.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid paras 73 and 108.
96 Ibid para 110.
97 Ibid para 112.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid para 113.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid para 118.
102 Ibid para 125.
103 Ibid para 94.
104 Ibid para 125.
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The court — rather unnecessarily — still nominally considered it
appropriate to support the view expressed in the IBCOS case, that US
copyright law was different from the UK law; it was said that US law drew a
distinction between ideas and expression, and did not provide protection to
functional works.105 However, the court was forced to acknowledge that
even if this was historically correct, the position had now changed: copyright
protection should not be extended to the functional aspects of a computer
program, such as the user interface.106 Although this necessarily required
drawing a line between idea and expression in a particular place, which may
be regarded as providing too little protection for a particular expression, this
was in accordance with the EU Software Directive.107
Relying on Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Designers’ Guild,108 the court
stated that the idea-expression distinction applies in two types of situations.
First, a copyright work which describes a system, concept or invention was
not infringed by the use of that which was described.109 Secondly, a
particular idea incorporated in a work (or aspects thereof) may not be
protected because it may not be original, or so commonplace that it does not
constitute a substantial part of the work. This assessment necessarily
depended on a particular level of abstraction, and an assessment of the skill
and labour involved in that aspect of the work.110 The court held that the
OpenRes system, as a whole, lacked substantiality and its overall functioning
was not the result of relevant skill and effort: its inputs and outputs were in a
form expected from a computer program carrying out that particular business
function. Thus, the claim for non-literal copying failed.111
This position was considered to be consistent with the policy of the EU
Software Directive, that is, to ‘exclude both computer languages and the
underlying ideas of the interfaces from protection’.112 If protection were
extended to the ‘business logic’ or overall function of a computer program,
the provisions of the Directive could be circumvented. In any event, it
would not have been appropriate to extend copyright protection to ‘business
logic’.113 The EU Software Directive excludes the protection of ideas and
principles which underlie any element of a program like its logic, algorithms,
programming languages or interfaces.114 The idea-expression dichotomy
105 Ibid para 91.
106 Ibid para 94.
107 Ibid.
108 Designer’s Guild Ltd v RussellWilliams Textiles Ltd [2000] 1WLR2416.
109 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 para 128.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid para 129.
112 Ibid para 130.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid para 87.
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also means that functional aspects will not be protected where these have
been independently replicated.115
In other words, a particular non-literal element will be protectable if at a
particular level of abstraction it amounted to something original, which
required skill and labour, other than the ‘business logic’ or overall function of
the computer program.116 The most recent decision of the European Court
of Justice, the SAS Institute case,117 conﬁrmed the approach in the Navitaire
case that it is permissible to emulate the functionality of a computer program,
including compatibility with its data ﬁle formats, by simply observing its
operation.
The SAS Institute case involved, inter alia, alleged copyright infringement
of SAS Institute’s SAS System, which was a statistical analytical software
program which enabled users to write and run application programs
(‘Scripts’), in the SAS computer language, to manipulate data.118 World
Programming Limited produced software, the World Programming System
(‘WPS’), designed to emulate the SAS System, by producing the same
outputs, based on the same inputs, as the SAS System. This enabled users to
run the Scripts developed for use with the SAS System on theWPS.119
The ECJ held that the functionality of a computer program, the program-
ming language and the format of data ﬁles used in a computer program in
order to exploit certain of its functions do not constitute protectable
expressions of a program for the purposes of art 1(2) of the Software
Directive.120Accordingly, the reproduction of the functionality of a program
by using the same programming language, and the same format of data ﬁles,
by means of observing, studying and testing the program, does not constitute
copyright infringement.121
While the keywords, syntax, commands and combinations of commands,
options, defaults and iterations, consisting of words, ﬁgures or mathematical
concepts, in isolation, were not protected by copyright, their choice,
sequence and combination could amount to the protectable expression of the
author of the computer program.122 Accordingly, it was for the relevant
national court — the English court — to determine if their choice, sequence
and combination amounted to protectable expression for purposes of
copyright.123
The English Court of Appeal held that there will not be a protectable,
original intellectual creation if the expression was dictated by technical
115 S Stokes ‘The development of UK software copyright law: From JohnRichard-
sonComputers toNavitaire’ (2005) 11CTLR 129 at 133.
116 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 paras 128–130.
117 SAS Institute Inc vWorld Programming Ltd supra note 10.
118 Ibid para 23.
119 Ibid para 24.
120 Ibid paras 39 and 46.
121 Ibid paras 44 and 45.
122 Ibid paras 66 and 67.
123 Ibid paras 69 and 70.
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function.124 This was signiﬁcant, because the court accepted that the design
of the SAS System, which allowed for numerous analytical options, was the
result of considerable intellectual effort based on statistical analysis.125 The
functionality of a computer program (in the sense of what it does and how it
responds to particular inputs) falls on the ideas side of the idea-expression
divide.126 The functionality of a computer program comprises those actions,
or purposes, which a user expects it to perform.127 Functionality amounted
to an idea, and, if it were allowed to be protected as such by copyright, it
would make it possible for someone to monopolise ideas.128This was also the
case where several functionalities were combined.129 Thus, the effort in
determining the functionality of a computer program, or a speciﬁc combina-
tion of functionalities, did not give rise to copyright protection.130 In so far as
computer programs were concerned, it was not just procedures, methods of
operation and mathematical concepts which were considered as falling
within the scope of ideas rather than expression; so too did keywords, syntax,
commands and combinations of commands, options, defaults, iterations
(which all consist of words, ﬁgures or mathematical concepts), and selections
of statistical operation.131 Even if these elements involved choices relating to
their selection or combination, such effort did not result in the creation of
protectable expressions, which is a more restricted concept than intellectual
creation.132
However, the particular manner in which formulae and algorithms are
combined (rather than the formulae and algorithms themselves) may amount
to a protectable expression if it involved the author’s own intellectual
creation.133 But in this case there could be no infringement on this basis as
WPS did not copy the program directly, as it had no access to the source code
or the object code.134
In the UK, like the US, there has also been a corresponding narrowing of
the scope of protection of the user interface of computer programs, as
evidenced in the subsequent Nova Productions case.135 In the Nova Productions
case the court stated that the EU Software Directive makes it clear that the
ideas incorporated in computer programs (which include their preparatory
design material) are not protected.136 What is not permitted is for another
124 Ibid para 33.
125 Ibid paras 13 and 14.
126 Ibid para 74.
127 Ibid paras 40 and 41.
128 Ibid paras 40, 41 and 43.
129 Ibid paras 44 and 45.
130 Ibid paras 45, 46 and 47.
131 Ibid paras 59.
132 Ibid paras 59 and 61.
133 Ibid para 42.
134 Ibid para 13.
135 Nova Productions Ltd vMazoomaGames Ltd supra note 10.
136 Ibid para 50.
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program to copy the speciﬁc expression of those ideas or functions, which
have been reduced to a material form, as a literary work. Others are free to
use the ideas or functions.137 The court held that while this position may be
considered as providing no effective protection for game developers, the fact
is that most, if not all, copyright works are inﬂuenced and derived from other
works, and it is important that copyright protection encourages competition
by not stiﬂing the creation of works which are actually very different.138 If
general ideas are protected, copyright would be an instrument of oppression
rather than act as an incentive for creation, which is its purpose.139
VI CONCLUSION
As the court stated in the Navitaire case, the scope of copyright protection of
computer programs is a matter that has ‘vexed many judges’140 and has not
been deﬁnitively settled, although greater clarity has been provided. Despite
the different nature of computer programs, the courts, at ﬁrst, incorrectly
analogised computer programs with copyright works with which they were
familiar, such as novels, resulting in the scope of protection being too broad.
The Computer Associates case’s narrow characterisation of the scope of
copyright protection of computer programs, and the Lotus case’s examination
of the protectability of elements of the user interface, is consistent with the
current position in the UK. Not only was the comparatively thin copyright
protection for computer programs, following the Navitaire decision, consid-
ered to strike an appropriate balance between providing the necessary
incentives and a sufﬁciently large public domain, it has been described as the
‘gold standard’ test in the UK for cases of non-literal copyright infringement
of computer programs.141
The fact is that the type of creativity involved in creating software is more
akin to that associated with an engineering project than artistic creativity.
Progress in such a technical ﬁeld is incremental, and excessive protection
prevents such an incremental, cumulative process from being realised. The
likelihood that good substitutable products are likely to emerge depends, to
some degree, on the scope of protection enjoyed by copyright owners. This
affects the extent of a copyright owner’s possible market power because such
market power would be proportional to the scope of copyright protection:
the narrower the scope of copyright protection, the more other works can
copy a copyright work.142 By allowing free use of ideas, general concepts and
other unprotectable elements embodied in copyright works, competition is
encouraged by copyright as it ‘foster[s] a built-in process of ‘reverse-
137 Ibid para 51.
138 Ibid para 54.
139 Ibid para 55.
140 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company supra note 5 para 93.
141 Murray op cit note 63 at 209; Stokes op cit note 115 at 133.
142 G S Lunney ‘Re-examining copyright’s incentive-access paradigm’ (1996) 49
Vanderbilt LR 483 at 518–9.
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engineering’ that enables many independently created and copyrightable
works to cluster around common themes or ideas’.143 These exceptions are,
thus, useful for potential competitors when considering whether they are
permitted to develop substitute, competitive computer programs. Competi-
tors would want their product to be as close as possible to a perfect substitute
to a successful product, if not superior. Although the current level of
protection essentially only prevents mechanical, or slavish, copying of
computer programs, as non-literal infringement of a computer program has
effectively been rejected by the courts; this limited right to prevent piracy or
slavish literal copying, combined with the ﬁrst-mover advantage, is sufﬁcient
to ensure that a third party does not gain an unfair advantage over the author
of the original program.
Providing over-broad copyright protection to literary works, other than
computer programs, only results in a small additional social cost. However,
computer programs are fundamentally different from other literary works as
they are instrumental in nature in that they are intended to bring about a
particular result. In this respect they resemble objects of mechanical utility,
which are generally protected by patent law. Although the functional nature
of computer programs did not prevent computer programs from being
copyrightable, it did change how they should be assessed in terms of
copyright doctrine.144
143 J H Reichman ‘Charting the collapse of the patent-copyright dichotomy: Pre-
mises for a restructured international intellectual property system’ (1995) 13 Cardozo
Arts & Entertainment LJ 475 at 494.
144 Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc supra note 15 at 819.
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